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Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. and the 1994 
Amendments: Is Joint and Several Liability Really 
Dead in Utah?* 
I. INTRODUCfiON 
It was the Utah Supreme Court's 1993 case of Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain Co. 1 which finally articulated how to judge the effect of immune 
parties within Utah's comparative negligence scheme. Before Sullivan, 
this area of Utah tort law was unresolved and in fact articulated two 
separate-and wholly incompatible-means for judging immune parties' 
impact when determining the percentage fault of non-immune defendants. 
The two acts which offered different schemes for determining tort 
remedies when immune parties are involved were the Utah Liability 
Reform Ace and the Workers' Compensation Act. 3 
The case's central question was whether parties who were immune 
from suit under the Workers' Compensation Statute4 should be included 
on the special verdict form for the apportionment of fault, as allowed by 
the Utah comparative negligence scheme.5 In resolving the differing 
compensation schemes offered by two acts, the court held that immune 
parties may be included on the jury form but that this was not to affect 
the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act. 6 
The Sullivan decision not only resolved an area where Utah laws 
were incompatible, it also set the stage for legislative amendments to the 
then-irreconcilable acts.7 This 1994legislation was entitled the Workers' 
Compensation and Liability Reform Act Amendments8 ("the 1994 
* Copyright <D 1995 by Lee Edwards. 
1. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993). 
2. Utah Liability Reform Act of 1986, ch. 199, 1986 Utah Laws 470 (codified at UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 to -43, -53 (1992 & Supp. 1994)). 
3. Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 100, 1917 Utah Laws 306 (codified in scattered 
sections of UTAH CODE ANN. Title 35) (originally established the Industrial Commission of 
Utah and the workers' compensation scheme. It was amended many times prior to the 1994 
amendments relevant to this note). 
4. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (1994). 
5. ld. § 78-27-39 (Supp. 1994). 
6. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 880-81 (Utah 1993). 
7. Workers' Compensation and Liability Reform Act Amendments, ch. 221, 1994 Utah 
Laws 1021 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62, 78-27-37 to -41). 
8. ld. 
327 
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Amendments"). It was passed "[i]n the waning hours of the 1994 Utah 
Legislative Session, [as] Senate Bill No. 224, [which was] a compromise 
engineered by the Governor. "9 The new legislation allowed immune 
entities to be included on the special verdict form. It also created the 
requirement that the fault attributable to immune parties be 40% or 
greater before the immune party could be included in the overall 
apportionment process under the Utah comparative negligence scheme. 10 
This note will review the historical background of the statutes 
affected by the 1994 Amendments; the court's analysis of Sullivan; and 
the 1994 Amendments and the effects of their 40% threshold for fault 
allocation. This note will further suggest the need for careful consider-
ation-and prescience-on the part of the litigator when an immune party 
is involved in the suit. Under the 1994 Amendments the amount of 
damages for which the non-immune defendant can be liable can largely 
depend on which side of the 40% threshold the immune party falls. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Workers' Compensation Act 
The Workers' Compensation Act, originally passed in 1917, created 
a no-fault compensation system for workers in the state of Utah.U The 
Act provides an exclusive remedy for an employee against an employer 
in a negligence action, 12 abrogating an employee's common law right to 
sue his or her employer for injuries suffered while in the course of 
employment. 13 The Act states: "The right to recover compensation 
pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive 
remedy against the employer. "14 
B. The Liability Reform Act 
Sixty years following the passage of the Workers' Compensation Act, 
the move toward comparative negligence in Utah began. In 1973 Utah 
abolished contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery in a 
negligence action and retained the doctrine of joint and several liabili-
9. Tim D. Dunn & W. Brent Wilcox, Significant Changes in Comparative Fault and 
Workers' Compensation Reimbursement, UTAH B.J., Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 8. 
10. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994). 
11. ld. §35-1-60(1994). 
12. ld. 
13. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612, 616 (Utah), 
appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948). 
14. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60 (1994). 
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ty. 15 Under the common law, the doctrine of joint and several liability 
"holds joint tortfeasors responsible for plaintiff's entire injury, allowing 
plaintiff to pursue all, some, or one of the tortfeasors responsible for his 
injury for the full amount of damages. "16 
But Utah was not long a joint and several liability state. In 1986 the 
legislature passed the Liability Reform Actl7 which abolished joint and 
several liability18 by requiring that "no defendant [be] liable to any 
person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant. " 19 Further, the Act defined a defen-
dant as a person not immune from suit who is "claimed to be liable 
because of fault to any person seeking recovery. "20 
III. THE SUILNAN DECISION 
The overlap of the doctrine of the immune employer found in Utah's 
Worker's Compensation legislation with the state's comparative 
negligence scheme gave rise to the Sullivan case. In this case, the court 
addressed the issue of whether a defendant can be liable for more than the 
fault attributable to it or if an immune party should be included in the 
special verdict form in order to determine the immune party's percentage 
of fault. 
The facts of this 1986 case involved Kenneth Sullivan, an employee 
of Scoular Grain Company, Freeport Center Associates, and Scoular 
Grain Company of Utah (the Scoular parties), who lost his left arm and 
left leg in an accident on the railroad tracks in Clearfield, Utah.21 
Sullivan brought suit against "the Scoular parties, Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, Oregon 
Short Line Railroad Company, Utah Power & Light Company, Track-
mobile, Inc., and G. W. Van Keppel Company. "22 
Of these parties the federal district court dismissed two. The Scoular 
parties were dismissed on the grounds that they were immune from suit 
under the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation 
15. Liability Reform Act of 1973, ch. 209, 1973 Utah Laws 710. 
16. Coney v. J.L.G. Indus. Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ill. 1983). 
17. Liability Reform Act of 1986, ch. 199, 1986 Utah Laws 470 (codified as amended 
at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43, -53 (1992 & Supp. 1994)). 
18. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1994). 
19. ld. § 78-27-38(3). 
20. ld. § 78-27-37(1) (Supp. 1994). 
21. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1993). 
22. ld. 
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Act. 23 The court dismissed Denver & Rio Grand Western Railroad 
because it found that no duty was owed to the Plaintiff. 24 
But after these immune parties were dismissed, defendant Track-
mobile moved to have these defendants included on the special verdict 
form. While Trackmobile understood the immune defendants could not 
ultimately be held liable, by asking that they be included on the special 
verdict form, Trackmobile sought, "to have the jury apportion and 
compare the fault of all the originally named defendants. "25 This 
presumably would tend to decrease the damages for which Trackmobile 
could ultimately be found liable. 
A. Immune Employers 
To determine whether immune employers, such as the Scoular parties 
in Sullivan, should be included on the special verdict form, the court 
stated its standard for statutory interpretation: "The court's principal duty 
in interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent, and the best 
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. "26 The 
court then looked to the definition of "defendant" in the comparative 
negligence statute as well as language elsewhere in the statute which gave 
an sense of which parties might be included in that definition. 27 As 
defined by the comparative negligence statute, a defendant is "any person 
not immune from suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any 
person seeking recovery. "28 This definition, the court acknowledged, 
would seemed to preclude the inclusion of immune parties on the special 
verdict form. 29 
However, the court found that this interpretation directly conflicted 
with language of two other sections of the comparative fault provision. 
23. /d. The section providing an exclusive remedy against an employer by an employee 
is UTAH CODE ANN. § 3'5-1-60 (Supp. 1994). 
24. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878-79. 
25. ld. at 879. 
26. ld. (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 
1984)). However, it is interesting to note that if this standard is strictly applied, the plain lan-
guage of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(1) could also preclude immune parties from being 
included on the special verdict form because they are not "defendants" as defined by the 
statute. Moreover, a different inference could be given to §§ 78-27-38 and -40 so as to apply 
only to parties that fall within the definition of "defendant." Under that analysis, non-immune 
parties are only ensured that they will be liable for the proportionate share of fault as against 
other non-immune parties. Therefore, the conflict could be avoided by applying the plain 
language of the definition of "defendant." See Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 885 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
27. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879. 
28. ld. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(1)). 
29. ld. 
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One section stated, "[n]o defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to 
that defendant. "30 Another section of the statute added, "the maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. "31 Given 
the apparent statutory contradiction, the court reasoned that if the immune 
entity was not included in the apportionment process and some fault was 
attributable to it, the third party defendant would be liable "in excess of 
[its] proportion of fault. "32 
The court gave the following hypothetical as an example of the effect 
of the statute if immune entities were not included on the special verdict 
form: "[I]f the Scoular parties were 90% at fault and the defendants 
remaining in the action were 10% at fault, the remaining defendants 
would be apportioned 100% of any damages awarded even though they 
were only 10% at fault. "33 In essence, this would have made the third-
party defendants jointly and severally liable for the fault of the immune 
party. 
The court then stated a second rule of statutory interpretations noting 
that "[t]he primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve. "34 The preliminary drafts of Senate Bill 64 (later the Liability 
Reform Act of 1986?5 stated in the title that one of the purposes of the 
legislation was to "[abolish] joint and several liability. "36 Furthermore, 
in the bill's legislative history, one Senator had stated that "it is the basic 
fairness concept we're driving at. The defendant ought to be on the hook 
only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the guarantor 
for everyone else's damages. "37 
Therefore, unless the immune parties were included in the apportion-
ment process, the "[legislative intent] would be frustrated" and "joint and 
several liability would result. " 38 The court held that "[a] jury may 
apportion the fault of employers under [the Liability Reform Act] 
30. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1994). 
31. /d. § 78-27-40. 
32. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879. 
33. /d. 
34. /d. at 880 (quoting Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991)). 
35. Liability Reform Act of 1986, ch. 199, 1986 Utah Laws 470 (codified at UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43, -53 (1992 & Supp. 1994)). 
36. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 880. 
37. /d. 
38. /d. 
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notwithstanding their immunity under [the Workers' Compensation 
Act]. "39 
Although the court held that immune parties must be included on the 
jury form, it stated that the inclusion of the party does not affect the 
exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act.40 The court held 
that the "[a]pportionment of fault does not of itself subject the employer 
to civil liability. Rather, the apportionment process merely ensures that 
no defendant is held liable to any claimant for an amount of damages in 
excess of the percentage of fault attributable to that defendant. "41 
Not only did the ruling leave the exclusive remedy of workers' 
compensation against the employer intact, it also left the employer with 
the full right to subrogate any claim the employee had against a third 
party for any benefits paid under workers' compensation. In reaching 
this decision, the court examined the laws of other jurisdictions and 
equitable considerations such as the fact that if the employee's claim is 
less than the workers' compensation benefits, the employee will take 
nothing in the action against the third party. 42 
B. Dismissed Nonemployer Defendants 
In considering Trackmobile's motion for inclusion of Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, the party dismissed on the merits, 
the court again considered the definitions in the Liability Reform Act. 
The Act defines "defendant" as "any person not immune from suit who 
is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recov-
ery. "43 The Act also defines "fault" as "any actionable breach of legal 
duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or 
damages. "44 The court recognized that "actionable" may be interpreted 
so that "the Act's definition of fault does not necessarily preclude the 
apportionment of fault of nonparties. "45 Nevertheless, the court held 
that "[since] the exclusion [of the dismissed party] will not subject the 
remaining defendants to potential liability for damage in excess of their 
proportionate fault," the nonemployer defendants that were dismissed 
based on an adjudication on the merits, could not be included on the 
special verdict form. 46 
39. ld. at 884. 
40. ld. at 880-881. 
41. ld. at 878. 
42. See supra part III. C. 
43. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 883 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(1), (2) (1986)). 
44. ld. 
45. ld. at 884. 
46. ld. 
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C. The Effect of the Holding 
Given the court's position regarding the immune employers and non-
employers, the result of the holding in this case can be quite harsh on the 
plaintiff and may allow an "at fault employer to escape liability altogether 
at the expense of the injured employee. "47 This is because: 
[When] an injured employee receives a judgment from a third-party 
defendant which is less than or equal to what the plaintiff receives in 
workers' compensation payments, the employee must subrogate the 
entire amount to the employer. In such a case, the employer or its in-
surer will pay little or nothing even though a large percentage of the 
fault is attributable to the employer. 48 
Justice Durham, writing for the majority, recognized the outcome 
could be inequitable and that the meaning of the statutory language, 
requiring that each defendant only be held liable for their relative portions 
of fault, is clear. 49 Recognizing this inequity, the majority referred to 
the need for legislative action to resolve the statutory conflict, stating 
"[The] plaintiff's remedy on this point is a legislative one. "50 In 
subsequent cases which followed the Sullivan precedent/1 there was also 
a clear message for legislative resolution from the court. Both the 
majority and dissent in these later cases confirmed the need for legislative 
change. 52 
IV. THE 1994 AMENDMENTS 
The Workers' Compensation and Liability Reform Act Amendments 
of 199453 were a response to the court's suggestion that a change in the 
legislation in this area was needed. 54 The bill was drafted by the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah and supported by the Utah Trial 
47. /d. at 883. 
48. Geoffrey C. Haslam, Apportioning the Comparative Fault of Non-party Joint 
Tortjeasors, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 444, 450. 
49. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 883. 
50. /d. 
51. See Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993); Brown v. Royer-
Washington Boulevard Assocs., 856 P.2d 352 (Utah 1993). 
52. See Brown, 856 P.2d at 355. (Durham, J., concurring, "I hope that the legislature 
will address the issue." Stewart, J., dissenting, "It appears that the Legislature ought to 
readdress the issue."). 
53. Workers' Compensation and Liability Reform Act Amendments, ch. 221 , 1994 Utah 
Laws 1021 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-62, 78-27-37 to -41 (Supp. 
1994)). 
54. See supra note 52. 
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Association which would have effectively overruled the Sullivan 
decision. 55 Various interests including the Manufacturer's Association, 
the insurance industry and large corporations opposed this bill "apparent-
ly ... willing to take an increase in workers' compensation premiums 
in return for having less third party tort liability. "56 
The final 1994 Amendments allow a party immune from suit to be 
included on the special verdict form. 57 However, the Amendments treat 
the immune party differently depending on whether or not fault allocated 
is greater or less than 40% . 58 
The statute makes clear that the exclusive remedy through workers' 
compensation is to remain in place and that the immune employer is only 
included on the special verdict form for purposes of apportionment: 
The apportionment of fuult to the employer in a civil action against a 
third party is not an action at law and does not impose any liability on 
the employer. The apportionment of fuult does not alter or diminish the 
exclusiveness of the remedy provided to employees, their heirs, or 
personal representatives, or the immunity provided employers pursuant 
to Section 35-1-60 for injuries sustained by an employee, whether 
resulting in death or not. Any court in which a civil action is pending 
shall issue a partial summary judgment to an employer with respect to 
the employer's immunity as provided in Section 35-1-60 [regarding the 
exclusive remedy of workers' compensation], even though the conduct 
of the employer may be considered in allocating fuult to the employer 
in a third party action in the manner provided in [the comparative fuult 
sections]. 59 
Only following the apportionment process is the immune defendant then 
treated differently, depending on whether or not the fault apportioned to 
that defendant is greater or less than 40% . 60 
A. When the Fault of the Immune Entity is Less than 40% 
If the jury apportions less than 40% of fault to the immune parties: 
55. Dunn & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 10. 
56. /d. For a discussion regarding why workers' compensation premiums would likely 
rise both in the 1994 Amendments and in the bill supported by the Manufacturer's Association 
see infra part IV. C and note 85 and accompanying text. 
57. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(1) (Supp. 1994). 
58. /d. § 78-27-39(2)(a)-(b). 
59. /d. § 35-1-62(6) (1994). 
60. Compare id. § 78-27-39(2)(a) (Supp. 1994 )(stating the effect of apportionment when 
fault is less than 40%) with § 78-27-39(2)(b) (stating the effect of apportionment when fault is 
40% or more) and § 35-1-62(5)(b )(i)-(ii) ( 1994) (regarding the right of reimbursement of the 
self insured employer or carrier). These sections taken together attempt to remedy the harsh 
effect of the decision as discussed infra part III.C. 
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the trial court shall reduce that percentage or proportion of fuult to zero 
and reallocate that percentage or proportion of fuult to the other parties 
in proportion to the percentage or proportion of fuult initially attributed 
to each party by the filet finder. After this reallocation, cumulative 
fuult shall equal 100% with the persons immune from suit being allo-
cated no fuult. 61 
335 
For example, if the jury apportions 30% of fault to the immune 
parties, and there are two non-immune third party defendants each receiv-
ing 35% of the fault, the immune parties fault would be reduced to zero 
and re-allocated among the non-immune third party defendants. In this 
situation, each third party defendant would be liable for 50% of the 
damages. 62 Since the remaining fault is reallocated among the parties, 
to a certain extent, this effectively makes the third-party defendants 
jointly and severally liable for the amount of the employers' fault. 
When the fault of the immune entity is less than 40%, the employee 
is required to reimburse the employer or insurer for the full amount of 
workers' compensation benefits, "without reduction" less the proportion-
ate share of costs and attorneys' fees. 63 The portion of the statute 
relating to reimbursement is substantially the same as the holding in the 
Sullivan case except that full reimbursement is now required only if the 
immune entities' fault is less than 40%. 
Therefore, applying the reimbursement requirement to the previous 
example, when the immune employer's fault is 30% the employer or the 
insurance carrier has a right to full reimbursement of workers' compensa-
tion benefits (less the reasonable proportionate share of attorneys' fees) 
even though the employer shares a percentage of the fault. For example, 
if the immune employer's fault is determined to be 30% and if there are 
two third parties each being 35% at fault (resulting in 100% of fault), the 
employer's fault would be reallocated,64 and each third party would be 
liable for 50%. If there were $100,000 in damages and the employee-
plaintiff received $10,000 in workers' compensation benefits, the 
employee-plaintiff would have a judgement of $50,000 from each third 
party defendant subrogated to a claim for reimbursement for $10,000 by 
the employer under the Workers' Compensation Statute. 65 Generally, 
"[the] common-law doctrine of joint and several liability holds joint 
tortfeasors responsible for plaintifFs entire injury, allowing plaintiff to 
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(2)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
62. This hypothetical assumes that no fault is attributed to the plaintiff. 
63. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62(5)(a)-(b) (1994). 
64. ld. § 78-27-39(2)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
65. ld. § 35-1-62(5)(b)(i) (1994). 
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pursue all, some, or one of the tortfeasors responsible for his injury for 
full amount of the damages. "66 Under the 1994 Amendments, because 
fault is reallocated among the existing non-immune parties when the fault 
attributable to the immune parties is less than 40%, the third party 
defendant is jointly and severally liable for the immune parties' propor-
tionate fault after reallocation. 67 While the non-immune parties are not 
liable for the plaintiff's "entire injury," they will share jointly and 
severally in the immune parties amount of damages. 
Notably, the jury may not be told that if they allocate less than 40% 
of the fault to the immune defendants the third-party defendants may be 
liable for more than their proportionate share of fault. The statute states, 
"[t]he jury may not be advised of the effect of any reallocation under 
[this Section]. "68 In the end, when the employers fault is less than 
40%, the 1994 Amendments maintain a true no-fault worker compensa-
tion system as enacted in 1917.69 
B. When the Fault of the Immune Entity is Greater than 40% 
If the jury determines that the fault of the immune entity that was 
included on the special verdict form is greater than or equal to 40 
percent, the 1994 Amendments paint a much different picture. In these 
circumstances, "that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to 
persons immune from suit may not be reduced [and reallocated]." 70 
Although the immune employer's fault is not reduced, this does not 
subject the immune employer to liability based on the allocation of 
fault. 71 It simply guarantees "the maximum amount for which a 
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage 
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion 
of fault attributed to that defendant. "72 
For example, if the jury apportions 70% of the fault to the immune 
employer and 30% to the non-immune third party defendants and the 
66. Coney v. J.L.G. Indus. Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ill. 1983). 
67. If there is more than one third party defendant, the defendants are not jointly and 
severally liable for each others fault, however they are jointly and severally liable against the 
immune party. 
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(2)(c)(i) (Supp. 1994). 
69. Workers' Compensation Act of 1917, ch. 100, 1917 Utah Laws 306. 
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(2)(b) (Supp. 1994). 
71. /d. § 78-27-38. But cf id. § 35-l-62(5)(b)(ii) (1994) (the right to reimbursement by 
self-insuring employer or insurance carrier is reduced by the proportionate share of fault). 
72. ld. § 78-27-40(1) (Supp. 1994). Another part of the statute reiterates the fact that 
"[a] defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a civil action against any person 
immune from suit to recover damages resulting in the allocation of fault." ld. § 78-27-40(3). 
This attempts to maintain the integrity of the no-fault Workers' Compensation Act. 
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damages are $100,000, the plaintiff may recover $30,000 from the third-
party defendant and the employer doesn't have a right to full subrogation 
of workers' compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff employee.73 In 
this case, the non-immune third-party defendant is only liable for the 
proportion of damages equivalent to the percentage of fault attributed to 
that defendant ($30,000). 74 Therefore, in this situation, damages are not 
shared jointly and severally among the non-immune parties for the fault 
of the immune employer. 
The court may advise the jury that "fault attributed to persons 
immune from suit may reduce the award of the person seeking recov-
ery. "75 In fact, it may be in the plaintiff's and the immune employer's 
best interest to request these instructions in order to influence the jury 
and bring the fault of the immune employer under the 40% threshold. 
If fault of the immune entity is less than 40%, the plaintiff would have 
full recovery from the non-immune third-party defendants76 and the 
employer would have the right to full reimbursement for the workers' 
compensation benefits. 77 By allowing the inclusion of immune parties 
in fault allocation, this substantially codifies the holding in Sullivan when 
the fault attributable to the immune party is equal to or greater than 
40%. 78 
This being the case, the 1994 Amendments still made significant 
changes regarding the right to reimbursement under the Workers' 
Compensation Statute. 79 The Sullivan decision discussed the detrimental 
effect of the reimbursement right to the plaintiff prior to the 1994 
Amendments: "[A]n employer or insurer [could] obtain reimbursement 
for any payments made to an injured employee. This lien is not reduced 
in any respect by the amount by which the employer's act or omission 
contributed to the employee's injuries."80 After the 1994 Amendments, 
when the fault of the immune employer is 40% or greater, the employer 
or employer's insurer (after an accounting for the share of attorneys' 
73. See id. § 78-27-39 (disallowing reduction and reallocation). See also id. § 35-1-
62(5)(b)(ii) (allowing for subrogation limited by the employer's percentage of fault). 
74. See id. § 78-27-40(1) (Supp. 1994). 
75. /d. § 78-27-39(2)(c)(ii). 
76. See id. § 78-27-39(2)(a) (reducing the fault of the immune entity to zero and re-
allocating the fault among the third party defendants). 
77. See id. § 35-1-62(5)(b)(i) (1994) (allowing reimbursement without reduction when 
the fault attributable to the immune employer is less than 40%). 
78. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1993). 
79. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (1994). 
80. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 883 (discussing the reimbursement provision of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 35-1-62 (1992)); see also supra part III.C (regarding the potentially harsh portents of 
the decision for employers). 
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fees)81 is entitled to reimbursement, "[subtracting] the amount of 
payments made multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to the 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the action 
against the third party. "82 Therefore, as in the previous example, if the 
employer is 70% at fault and the payments were $10,00083 the employer 
would have the right of reimbursement "for the payments made [$10,000] 
... less the [product of the] amount of payments made [$10,000] 
multiplied by the percentage of fault [70%]. "84 The original amount 
($10,000) would therefore be reduced by $7000, leaving the employer or 
insurance carrier with a right of reimbursement of $3000. 
If the fault of the immune employer is likely to approach 40%, the 
employer or insurer may wish to intervene rather than relying on the 
plaintiff's case as specifically allowed in the 1994 Amendments. This is 
because if fault of the employer is allocated under the 40% threshold the 
employer will retain right to full reimbursement of workers' compensa-
tion benefits. 85 
C. Employer Intervention when Fault is Greater Than 40% 
Because the interest of the employer or the employer's insurer in the 
right to reimbursement for payments under the Workers' Compensation 
Statute may be reduced if the fault attributed to the employer is greater 
than or equal to 40%, the employer may want to intervene to protect his 
or her interests. It has been suggested that 
[the 1994 Amendments] still [require] the employer to defend those 
cases where it believes it may have some exposure of having fuult in 
excess of 40%, but it would not 'have to defend cases where it believes 
it is below the threshold or it is willing to rely upon the plaintiff's case 
as its defense. 86 
The possible reduction in the right of reimbursement and the increase in 
the cost of litigation are the reasons that workers' compensation 
premiums will probably increase. 
81. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62(5)(a) (1994). 
82. ld. § 35-1-62(5)(b)(ii). 
83. This hypothetical assumes that the proportionate share of attorneys' fees were already 
accounted for according to § 35-1-62(5)(a) of the Utah Code. 
84. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62(5)(b)(ii) (1994). 
85. ld. § 78-27-41(3)(a)-(b)(Supp.1994). Thisispartofthereasonworkers'compensa-
tion premiums will likely increase and was part of the compromise discussed infra note 56 and 
accompanying text. The legislature was apparently balancing an increase in workers' 
compensation premiums against a possible increase in third-party tort I iability. 
86. Dunn & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 10. 
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The 1994 Amendments specifically provide that the employer has the 
right to intervene to protect his or her interest. "A person immune from 
suit may intervene as a party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, regardless of whether or not money damages are sought. "87 
The statute provides that the injured employee must give notice to the 
employer or insurer of "any known attempt to attribute fault to the 
employer. "88 While the employer has the right to receive notice and 
intervene in any case where his or her interests may be at stake, it is only 
necessary to do so when the jury may apportion 40% or greater of the 
fault to the employer. 
This requires the attorney advising the client to predict the outcome 
of the trial before the jury retires. The 1994 Amendments do "[make] 
it more difficult to advise . . . clients as to what to expect out of the 
eventual outcome of the case. "89 Because jury verdicts are hard to 
predict, the question of whether to intervene or not will require careful 
consideration and prescience on the part of the litigator for non-immune 
party defendant. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the end, the Sullivan case led to a substantial change in the Utah 
comparative negligence scheme by influencing the legislature to enact the 
1994 Amendments. The new threshold of 40% fault revived joint and 
several liability for third party defendants when the fault attributed to the 
immune party is less than 40%. Thus, the 1994 Amendments altered the 
express purpose of the Liability Reform Act of 198690 by reviving a 
form of joint and several liability in some circumstances. Because of the 
interaction between the right to reimbursement under workers' compensa-
tion and the 40% threshold, counsel for the employer or the insurer must 
make an educated guess as to the amount of fault the jury will apportion 
to their client before determining whether or not to intervene. 
Lee Edwards 
87. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-41(3)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
88. ld. § 35-1-62(3)(b) (1994). 
89. Dunn & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 11. 
90. Liability Reform Act of 1986, ch. 199, 1986 Utah Laws 470 (codified as amended 
at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43, -53 (Supp. 1994)). 
